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In his 1984 book, Elbow Room, Daniel Dennett offered a description that perfectly captures the 
experience of searching for and defining the self. 
 
[You] enter the brain through the eye, march up the optic nerve, round and round the cortex, 
looking be- hind every neuron, and then, before you know it, you emerge into daylight on the 
spike of a motor nerve impulse, scratching your head and wondering where the self is. (p. 75) 
 
Even though Westen was not attempting to identify the neurological basis for the self, after 
reviewing each and every self-representation that he presents, I, like Dennett, found myself 
wondering just what this thing is that we call the self. To formulate an integrated theory of the self is 
indeed a monumental project. In this commentary, I discuss several fundamental issues pertinent to 
an integrated theory of the self. 
 
Self-Representations and Consciousness 
 
One of the most powerful tenets common to psycho- dynamic theories is the view that particular 
processes operate outside of awareness (e.g., the operation of defense mechanisms) and that 
unconscious memories or drives influence behavior. This fundamental aspect of psychodynamic  
theories must be addressed in any account that seeks to integrate traditional and cognitive models of 
the self. I believe, as does Westen, that clinical observation, and indeed the observation of everyday life, 
provides compelling evidence that individuals operate without full awareness of all aspects of self- 
representation. This view, that individuals do not have knowledge of all the factors or even the most 
important factors that determine their behavior, is quite widely accept- ed (Uleman & Bargh, 1989). 
But an appreciation of psycho- dynamic and cognitive perspectives suggests that not all self- 
representations are unconscious for the same reasons, nor is the manner in which they operate to 
influence behavior and affect always the same. 
From a psychodynamic perspective, one assumes that there is a motivational basis for self-
representations, or portions thereof, to remain unconscious. As Westen's example of sexual abuse 
illustrates, clinicians are usually inclined to consider the unconscious and motivational factors when 
presented with symptoms or aspects of behavior that cannot be fully understood within the 
framework of what the client can tell us about himself or herself. From a cognitive perspec- tive, 
one need not invoke the concept of motivation to under- stand why self-representations remain outside 
of awareness. Self-representations may remain outside of awareness sim- ply because they have 
not been activated recently or with sufficient frequency to be readily accessible. 1 
A comprehensive model of the self should (a) include an appreciation of the relation between 
conscious and unconscious aspects of self-representation and (b) provide a theoretical basis for 
researchers and clinicians to identify and differentiate aspects of self-representations that are truly un- 
conscious in the psychodynamic sense from those which are inaccessible in the cognitive sense.  
 
1The accessibility of self-representations is not synonymous with awareness or consciousness of self-representations (Bargh, 1989). A self- 
representation may be highly or chronically accessible yet operate outside of awareness to influence behavior and affect. Such effects are likely to 
operate automatically (Moretti & Shaw, 1989). 
 
 
 
 
In previous work, my colleagues and I have stressed the importance of understand- ing the self as a 
system, and the value of this perspective in guiding therapeutic interventions (Moretti &  Higgins, 
1990a; Moretti, Higgins, & Feldman, 1990). If, as a clinician, I can identify those aspects of self-
representation that remain unconscious for motivational reasons, I am likely to direct my interventions 
toward these motivational issues (e.g., defensive maneuvers against affective and self-definitional 
consequences related to awareness of unconscious aspects of self; discrepancy between actual-self 
and other significant self-representations). In contrast, if I believe that particular aspects of self-
representation are unconscious sim- ply for cognitive reasons, I may attempt to directly activate these 
aspects of the self. Motivational and cognitive factors may frequently operate together to render 
particular self-representations unconscious so that a variety of therapeutic techniques are required to 
bring these self-representations into awareness. 
I believe that many clinicians intuitively know, or believe that they know, when motivational 
versus cognitive factors account for a patient's lack of awareness of aspects of self-representation. 
But currently we do not have a clear model of the self that makes this process of identification explicit. 
Our understanding of psychodynamic  and cognitive theory does, however,  support specific 
predictions  regarding  the consequences of bringing motivationally based versus cognitively based 
unconscious self-representations into awareness. And I believe that the cognitive, affective, and 
motivational factors  that  are  important  here  can  indeed  be  studied  empirically. For example, it 
seems reasonable to predict that the consequences of priming motivationally based unconscious self-
representations would be quite different from the consequences of priming cognitively based 
unconscious self-representations.  In fact, research  utilizing  priming  techniques has  demonstrated  
that  activating  discrepant  self-structures provokes specific affective and physiological responses that 
differ from responses associated with the activation of nondiscrepant self-structures (Strauman, 1989; 
Strauman & Hig- gins,  1987). 
One might also predict that motivationally based and cognitively based unconscious self-
representations may differ in how easily they can be brought into awareness. Unconscious aspects of 
self-representation that are associated with negative affect and/or are in opposition to conscious 
aspects of self-representations may be quite difficult to bring into awareness, although the effects of 
these representations on information processing and affect may occur automatically (Strauman, 1990) 
and may even be difficult to inhibit (Moretti & Shaw,  1989). 
Finally, clinical observation and research suggests that when conscious self-representations are 
incongruent or in opposition to what is consciously represented, individuals may demonstrate less 
cohesiveness in their self-descriptions and may show incongruent affective responses when describing 
themselves. For example, when describing the self, some individuals may not display positive affect 
when describing seemingly positive aspects of themselves and may even demonstrate negative affect or 
agitation (Moretti & Higgins, 1990b). The strategies that researchers have used to evaluate attachment 
representations (Crowell & Feldman, 1988; Kobak & Sceery, 1988; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985) 
seem promising to pursue in this regard. 
In sum, what the field currently needs is an integrated model of the self that explicitly addresses 
the direct and interactive role of motivational and cognitive factors on unconscious self-
representations. This would provide clear direction for researchers and clinicians to investigate these 
issues. 
 
Organization  of Self-Representations 
 
It is important to note that psychodynamic models typically "frame" the self within the context 
of a complex, developmental theory of personality. This aspect of psycho- dynamic theory 
represents both a great strength and a glaring weakness. The strength of such theories is, of course, 
their breadth and utility in providing a framework for understanding individuals. This is particularly 
helpful for understanding individuals within a psychotherapeutic context. The weak- ness is that the 
breadth of these theories has limited the extent to which they can be investigated empirically. In 
contrast to psychodynamic theories, contemporary models of the self that have emerged from 
cognitive theory tend to focus on one or two aspects of the self (e.g., Linville, 1985; Ogilvie, 
1987). Such models can be investigated empirically but are too limited to capture the complexity of 
the role of the self in psychological functioning. 
Westen's model of the self certainly provided me with a revised and expanded set of terms to 
 
 
describe the self. Some of these terms are familiar from the work of several self theorists. For 
example, Westen's discussion of the concept of the working self is quite similar to that proposed by 
Markus (Markus & Ruvolo, 1989). Further, his description of the wished-for self resembles the 
concept of the ideal self pro- posed by Rogers (1965) and elaborated more recently by Higgins 
(1987). Other terms are indeed quite new and high- light extremely important aspects of self-
representation. For example, Westen's self with other representation and representation of others' 
representation of the self revitalize and clarify dynamic concepts of the self introduced by theorists 
such as Sullivan (1953) and Homey (1937). 
Although I found Westen's discussion of the various types of self-representation interesting and 
provocative, the list of potential self-representations one could generate seems virtually endless (e.g., 
Westen's example of the self-involved- in-sports; my example of the self-not-involved-in-sports).  In 
the absence of a clear overarching theoretical structure, this proliferation of selves appears  
problematic.  For example, from such a perspective it seems difficult to clinically or empirically  map 
out and investigate major aspects of self-representation.  In the clinical context, enumerating all the 
self-representations that a patient could generate (as well as those  I could  hypothesize  as existing  
on  an unconscious level) would not be of great value in providing a framework to direct my 
interventions.  In terms of research,  it may be quite easy to investigate any number of self-
representations, but it is unlikely that this research will provide further insight into the substantive 
issues regarding self-representation. 
What seems to be necessary is a model that provides sufficient breadth and structure to explain the 
development and complexity of self-functions, but at the same time retains sufficient clarity and 
specificity in the constructs that it embraces. At the present time, there are few models that offer such 
flexibility. Kohut (1978), for example, offers a model of the self that captures the complexity of self-
functions; how- ever, his constructs are difficult to evaluate empirically (see Kohut, 1984, for a 
discussion of the limitations of empirical methods in the study of complex mental states). 
One model that has attempted to offer a broad theoretical perspective but has retained construct 
specificity and clarity is Higgins's (1987) self-discrepancy theory. Self-discrepancy theory provides a 
clear description of the structure of self-representation and the consequences of inconsistency be- 
tween self-representations. Recent attempts have also been made to delineate the cognitive, affective, 
and socialization factors that lead to the development of pathological self-structures (Higgins, 1989; 
Moretti & Higgins, 1990a). The formulation of models, such as self-discrepancy theory, that offer 
theoretical structure, breadth, and clarity of constructs will very much contribute to the emergence of 
an integrated theory of the self. 
 
Self-Representation  and Self-Esteem 
 
Westen's view of self-esteem is similar to that proposed by classic and contemporary models that 
emphasize the importance of discrepancy between the actual self and a desired self-state representation 
in determining self-esteem (Cooper- smith, 1967; James, 1890/1950; Moretti & Higgins, 1990b; 
Rosenberg, 1979). These models also suggest that individuals differ significantly in the types of 
standards they hold for themselves and that, therefore, actual-self attributes are not equally important 
in determining self-esteem for all individuals. Such theories of self-esteem aptly capture the dynamic 
flavor of self-esteem and account for the fact that self- esteem fluctuates across time and situations. 
Westen points out that individuals hold a global sense of self-esteem in addition to self-esteem 
related to specific self- representations. Our research suggests that even within specific self-
representations, particular components may be more important in determining  self-esteem than are 
others (Moretti & Higgins, 1990b). For example, we found that not all positive attributes of the actual 
self were equally related to global self-esteem. Actual-self attributes that matched the ideal-self guide 
were associated with higher levels of self- esteem, but actual-self attributes that were not represented 
in the ideal-self guide were unrelated to self-esteem. Similarly, negative actual-self attributes that were 
discrepant from the ideal-self guide were related to lower levels of self-esteem, but negative actual-
self attributes that were not represented in the ideal-self guide were unrelated to lower levels of self- 
esteem. 
This research highlights the importance of taking the entire self-system into consideration when 
evaluating self-es- teem. From a clinical perspective, it becomes clear that the psychological 
significance of each attribute within a self- representation is determined by its relation to other 
 
 
significant self-representations. Thus, the same positive attribute of the actual self may sometimes 
contribute to positive feelings about the self (i.e., if it matches a desired self-representation) and 
other times contribute to negative feelings about the self (i.e., if it is discrepant with another valued self-
representation). A clinician can only predict the psychological consequences of drawing attention to a 
positive or negative at- tribute of the self by understanding a patient's system of self- representations. 
From a research perspective, it is important to note that the majority of contemporary studies on self-
esteem employ self-report measures that simply ask individuals to rate their actual self on a 
predetermined set of attributes that are normatively positive or negative. To fully understand the 
transitory and stable aspects of self-esteem, it is critical that researchers in this field begin to adopt 
methodologies that allow them to idiographically assess self-esteem as a product of the relationships 
between various self-representations. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The emergence of an integrated model of the self-rooted in two traditions of psychology that each 
have had a profound effect on how we understand human nature-is indeed exciting. Psychodynamic 
models offer a great deal of richness for understanding the self; cognitive models offer precision and an 
appreciation of the nature and operation of representational structures. Integrating these two 
perspectives is not easy, and I believe we are only at the beginning of a long road of discussion and 
debate within the field. In this commentary, I have attempted to emphasize the need to develop a 
clear theoretical structure to guide our investigations of the self. This process may be facilitated by 
first reviewing basic assumptions and empirical evidence regarding the nature and operation of the self. 
 
Note 
 
Marlene M. Moretti, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British 
Columbia, V5A 1S6, Canada. 
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